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Resumo: O objetivo desta tese é analisar o conceito de r.b.u.., bem como as suas vantagens 
e desvantagens e em que medida o r.b.u. pode ser usado como um mecanismo de combate 
à pobreza. Para cumprir este objetivo, discutem-se os conceitos de r.b.u. e de pobreza e 
apresentam-se um conjunto de estudos de casos de aplicação prática do r.b.u. 
A pobreza encontra-se ligada a uma série de problemas sociais tais como a falta de educação, 
problemas de saúde (Forget (2011)), violência (Moser and Holland (1987)), criminalidade 
(Aue, Roosen, and Jensen (2016)), pelo que irão ser analisados também efeitos de 
externalidades positivas do r.b.u. sobre alguns destes fatores. 
Finalmente, recorrendo aos dados da experiência de Manitoba e fazendo uso de uma 
abordagem econométrica, procuram-se testar empiricamente alguns dos efeitos previstos do 
r.b.u. sobre a oferta de trabalho, o investimento na educação e a satisfação com o último 
emprego, funcionando estes dois como variáveis proxy que nos permitem analisar o efeito 
do r.b.u. sobre o nível de pobreza. Irão ser analisados os resultados por género para verificar 
se existem diferenças significativas. 
Os resultados, apesar de não revelarem uma correlação estatisticamente significativa entre o 
r.b.u. e os indicadores de interesse, apontam no sentido de o r.b.u. levar a um aumento no 
número de pessoas na escola e no nível de satisfação com o último emprego. A parte negativa 
dos resultados prende-se com o facto da existência de um r.b.u. levar a que o número de 
semanas trabalhadas diminua e que, parte desse efeito, possa não ser explicado apenas com 
base em pessoas que optaram por aumentar o seu nível de capital humano. Foi observável 
que os efeitos da introdução do r.b.u. foram diferentes para homens e mulheres. No entanto, 
tal é devido à diferença entre a percentagem de homens e mulheres a trabalharem.   
 
Códigos JEL: I32; I38 
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Abstract: This thesis goal is to analyse u.b.i.’s concept, as well as its advantages and 
disadvantages and how can u.b.i. be used as a mechanism to fight against poverty. To achieve 
such goal, we discuss u.b.i. and poverty’s concepts and present a set of case studies of u.b.i.’s 
practical application. 
Poverty is linked to a series of social problems such as the lack of education, health problems 
(Forget (2011)), violence (Moser and Holland (1987)), criminality (Aue et al. (2016)), so it 
will also be analysed positive externalities’ effects of u.b.i. around some of these factors. 
Finally, recurring to Manitoba’s experience data and by using an econometrical approach, we 
try to test empirically some of u.b.i.’s predicted effects regarding job supply, investment in 
education and satisfaction with last job, being the last two proxy variables that allow us to 
study the effect of u.b.i. over poverty. There will be analysed results by gender to see if there 
are significant differences between males and females. 
The results, even though they haven’t revealed a statistically significant correlation between 
u.b.i. and the indicators we are analysing, point out that u.b.i. causes an increase in school 
enrolment and in job satisfaction with last job. The results’ downside is that u.b.i. also causes 
a decrease in the number of weeks worked, that can only be partially explained by people 
choosing to improve human capital levels. It has been observable that u.b.i.’s introduction 
effects were different for women and men. However, such difference can be explained 
because of the difference in the percentage of males and females that work. 
 
JEL codes: I32; I38 
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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of times that poverty exists, however what has changed is the awareness 
in the face of poverty. There are multiple types of poverty, being the most debated and 
uncontrolled one right now is persistent poverty, a phenomenon characterized by the fact 
that individuals remain poor through several generations, because of the effects of the so-
called poverty traps. They may occur because individuals voluntarily take risks hoping to stop 
being poor, what causes them to sacrifice a part of their already really low wealth that causes 
them to become even poorer (Sadler (2000)). Another possible cause may be the existence 
of multiple equilibriums, arising from the fact that households do not have the necessary 
amounts of resources to recover from a shock (Barrett and Swallow (2006)) or that 
agriculture sector dominance results in a low equilibrium, that is, will cause poverty to be the 
equilibrium (Graham and Temple (2006)).    
This thesis research question is to find out whether the introduction of an universal basic 
income could act as a more efficient mechanism of reducing poverty, when compared with 
the current applied welfare measures. 
A state has three basic functions: ensuring equity through redistribution of income, 
promoting efficiency in allocating resources and regulating the level of economic activity. It 
has been observed that, due to the higher level of awareness in the face of poverty, the 
importance of the social state has been increasing, but it is no less true that the level of 
pressure on the social state has also continually increased. As the 2018 Annual report of the 
board of trustees of the federal old-age and survivors’ insurance and federal disability insurance trust funds 
states this puts at risk social security’s sustainability and, worse, it shows that despite all 
efforts enrolled in ending with poverty, even in developed countries such goal was not 
achieved yet. There is an extensive empirical evidence that shows that the existence of an 
unemployment benefit leads the duration of unemployment to increase (Card and Levine 
(2000); Filiz (2017) and Johnston and Mas (2018)) and that family allowance has no 
significant effect on poverty reduction (Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2018)), which points out that there 
are more efficient alternative ways for the Social State to fight poverty. Based on this idea 
that the current applied measures are not as effective as they should be, the concept of an 
universal basic income (u.b.i) emerges, being this discussion’s main goals to find whether its 
implementation is feasible or not and if it can be an optimal solution, that is, the most 
efficient one to mitigate poverty levels.  
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This thesis is organized as it follows: in section 2 it will be done an extensive literature review, 
where in a first phase the concepts of universal basic income and poverty will be analysed in 
a broader way, mentioning some of the most common indicators used to measure poverty 
and to define poverty levels and, in a second phase, it will be analysed the advantages and 
disadvantages compared with the already existent social measures such as unemployment 
benefit or social inclusion income. It will also be analysed u.b.i.’s strengths and weaknesses, 
referring some possible solutions to improve the measure’s feasibility. Then, in section 3 it 
will be made an empirical case studies analysis, seeing what were the (observable) results 
arising from the implementation of an u.b.i. in countries as different as U.S.A., Canada, 
Finland, Ecuador, India or Kenya. After that, there will be created some regressions based 
on the Manitoba’s experience, the only one that has put all data available for free in the 
Internet, and also the first one to be estimated, in order to analyse the effects of the 
implementation of an u.b.i. on the number of weeks worked, school enrolment and job 
satisfaction, the last two will be considered as proxies for measuring poverty’s evaluation1. 
The idea is to see whether the results observed through the regressions’ compilation are in 
line with those that are predicted by the existent literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 For more details see https://dataverse.lib.umanitoba.ca/dataverse/Mincome_Data 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Exploring the concepts of universal basic income and poverty 
Along this thesis the key concepts will be universal basic income and poverty.                                   
Universal Basic Income (u.b.i.) consists on a monetary transfer with periodic character 
assigned by the state to everyone on an individual basis. Its value is constant and independent 
of the individual's wealth, having its beneficiary total freedom to decide how they want to 
spend that income. It is also an unconditional transfer, so it is not necessary for the individual 
to find himself working or even to show willingness to work, and if he chooses to work, he 
may accumulate the salary with this additional income2. It may be a total u.b.i. if it allows the 
elimination of poverty and the inclusion of all individuals in society or it may be a partial 
u.b.i. if, to achieve such goals, it must be complemented by other social redistribution 
measures. 
According with Britannica Encyclopaedia, poverty is defined as a situation where a given 
individual is not able to satisfy his basic needs. The definition of what is a basic need however 
is not universally accepted: regarding less developed countries poverty is defined as an 
individual not being able to meet the survival needs, while to the extent of developed 
countries poverty is defined as an individual not being able to meet some needs that are 
fulfilled for most of the population.                                                                                                        
Although most people conceive poverty as a general concept there are several types of 
poverty: Cyclical poverty, for example, occurs when poverty spreads through a given 
community embracing most of its individuals for a short period of time, either because of 
the business cycles’ effects (Herzer and Klump (2009)) or due to environmental related issues 
which cause a given country to face scarcity of basic goods (Narloch and Bangalore (2018)). 
We must note that this type of poverty is the one that is more controlled, with the 
unemployment benefit, for example, acting as an automatic stabilizer, that is, ensuring people 
have a new source of income when they lose their jobs and causing expenditure to rise during 
a recession (Bitler and Hoynes (2016)). Much more dramatic is collective poverty, that is a 
type of poverty which involves permanent inability for a given group of people to be able to 
satisfy their basic needs, causing poverty to pass from one generation to the other. This type 
of poverty occurs mainly in undeveloped countries, either from Africa, Central and South 
                                                          
2 For more details see https://basicincome.org/basic-income/ 
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America or in some parts of Asia and the main reason why it emerges is that in such 
countries, even if resources were distributed in a fair way, they would not be enough to meet 
all the population’s basic needs (Cabrera, Lustig, and Morán (2015)). This type of poverty is 
also called chronic or generational poverty. There must however be noticed that, in 
developed countries, there is a social exclusion phenomenon that causes some groups of 
people to be marginalized leading to the creation of areas known as ghettos, where such 
problems may also occur, being this type of poverty known as concentrated collective 
poverty (Devicienti and Poggi (2011)).  Finally, it must also be mentioned case poverty, which 
consists on a situation in which, despite the surrounding households being healthy enough 
to supply all the basic needs, a household or an insignificant percentage in the total number 
is not able to do so3. 
Other poverty approach distinguishes between primary poverty, a situation where, even if 
individuals are able to maximize the utility they can obtain from their income they are still in 
a situation where they cannot meet their basic needs and secondary poverty, a situation where 
individuals become poor because they have not spent their income in a wise way, either they 
have bought luxury goods or they have misinterpreted their needs.4 
Finally, even the mentioned concentrated collective poverty can be divided into two different 
situations: rural poverty and urban poverty.5 
Rural poverty is characterized by situations where the populations tend to be very small and 
hugely dependent on the primary sector performance. In such areas the low populational 
level generates low demand levels which causes a vicious cycle of poverty: as people are poor 
nobody wants to invest and as nobody wants to invest the populations remain extremely 
poor. In these areas, typically, there are not public transports or good accesses for example 
which causes them to be unattractive to foreigners (Fisher (2005). 
Urban poverty is characterized by extremely large populations (the opposite situation) and 
the existence of extremely qualified employment. What usually happens is that the poor 
people from rural areas decide to move to the largest cities. However, their qualifications are 
low and most of the job offers require high qualified people. The result will be an excess of 
labour supply for less qualified jobs, what will result in part of that population finding 
                                                          
3 For more details see https://www.britannica.com/topic/poverty 
4 For more details see https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/135495/labour-markets/measures-of-poverty/ 
5 For more details see https://borgenproject.org/tag/rural-vs-urban-poverty/ 
5 
 
themselves without any means of subsistence, causing them to be faced with a situation of 
poverty. As these populations tend to grow quickly the result will be that the number of 
unskilled people along time will continuously increase, generating higher and higher poverty 
rates. It is worth to mention also that in those areas there are excellent transportation 
conditions as well as good accesses which cause them to be attractive for foreigners that 
arrive full of hope and then face the harsh reality, repeating the process over and over (Lucci, 
Bhatkal, and Khan (2018)). 
2.2. Some poverty indicators 
Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon (2002) state that to be able to define who is poor and who 
is not, first we need to select one of the many dimensions of an individual’s well-being. Then 
we define our poverty line, that is the threshold below which we will consider a given 
individual as being poor. Finally, we need to set a poverty measure to be used to report to 
the population as an all or to a key subgroup. 
One of the most common poverty approaches relies on monetary indicators and typically it 
is selected the income as a proxy to define whether someone is poor or not. However, it 
makes much more sense to use the levels of consumption as a monetary indicator, as it is 
possible for us to have extra income besides the one we report but it is impossible for us to 
have a higher consumption than we report. Besides that, there are a given number of 
professional activities that have uncertain income, such as the ones linked with agriculture 
for example but, if we consider the idea that individuals like to smooth their consumption, 
the fluctuations in their levels of consumption will be much lower than their fluctuations in 
the level of income. Thus, it is much easier to measure consumption levels than to measure 
income amounts (Slesnick (1993)). Finally, when measuring consumption levels, it is possible 
to find out whether individuals can have access to the financial markets or not, what allows 
us to infer about their past financial situation.                                                                                                                                           
It must be noticed, however, that sometimes we are not able to see how much individuals 
spend and which kind of goods they buy, and this indicator does not allow us to determine 
the origin of such income, so the ideal is to analyze both the income and the consumption 
indicators. Notice that spending on raw materials used to produce a given commercial activity 
should not be considered neither as income, because, as the gross value-added theory state, 
do not impact on people’s income (first enter as a expense that ought to be deduced from 
the total sales value) nor as consumption, because the marginal utility people can get from 
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them before the product transformation is null (Varnavskii (2018), on an international trade 
application). 
In any of the cases, when comparing different types of households, it becomes important to 
make sure that their different needs require different levels of income: a household A with 
two small children will need a higher income than a household B with four adults: as so their 
poverty lines will necessarily be different. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded the existence 
of economies of scale within a household: no matter how many people live in a given house 
there is a minimum amount of water or energy that ought to be spent and in a house can live 
up to a certain number of people without being any lack of space (Ironmonger, Aitken, and 
Erbas (1995)). The existence of such economies of scale will lead the poverty line for a couple 
with a wealth of A to be lower than twice the amount that it is defined for an individual with 
that same level of wealth. Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013) take their analysis to the 
next level stating that the existence of such economies of scale will increase the individual’s 
bargaining power, that is, while a given individual may face a high level of pressure in 
accepting any job offer a set of individuals will not face the same amount of pressure. 
The other poverty approaches rely on non-monetary indicators. There are multiple 
approaches of this type:6 
1) An approach to poverty based on health and nutrition conditions uses indicators such as 
the average life expectancy at birth, the incidence of a given type of diseases or the incidence 
of hunger in children for example. However, these indicators, except for the average life 
expectancy at birth are more commonly used as a measure of absolute poverty rather than 
relative poverty;                                                                                                                                                                     
2) An approach based on educational attainment is also possible. In this case a comparison 
between the average observed level of schooling compared with the one the economic theory 
would predict or analyzing the average level of education simply are widely used measures. 
It is not uncommon as well to compare academic results. However, as the scales are different 
and as the methods of teaching also differ between countries the results will tend to suffer 
from endogeneity bias inference;                                                                                                                           
                                                          
6https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1032/1795ff9abe2f47f34c884868b523db85b1dd.pdf?_ga=2.50069926.164
9529803.1561565644-366696206.1561565644  
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3) An approach that relies on subjective measures of poverty that are determined based on 
census provided to individuals where they ought to evaluate how they evaluate their situation 
when compared with the average individual and how they rate the situation of all types of 
people when compared with the average individual. However, these results can be biased due 
to the existence of discrimination patterns or because people’s perception is different from 
government’s keen measures; 
Currently the World Bank Group defines poverty as someone who lives with less than 1.90 
dollars a day7. However, that is the definition of absolute poverty and cannot be applied to 
every country: in a developed country there are almost no one who lives with less than 1,90 
dollars a day and yet there are still poor people in such countries. As so, we must consider 
the concept of relative poverty.   
However, the concept of relative poverty states that someone is poor from the moment 
when he/she cannot meet needs that are met by most of the population, what is a vague 
concept (Alkire and Foster (2011)). 
A one-dimensional count of poverty is not desirable since there are many dimensions of 
poverty that are linearly independent of each other, that is, it isn’t because an individual has 
a house of his own that we are able to conclude that such house allows him to live without 
any deprivations (Alkire and Foster (2011)). 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) state that “a multidimensional approach to poverty 
defines poverty as a shortfall from a threshold on each dimension of an individual's well-
being”. Taking such statement into account, several methods of measuring poverty have 
arisen. 
According to Alkire and Foster (2011), globally speaking there are two major challenges 
facing the existence of multidimensional poverty: on the one hand, the generality of models 
assume that the variables that determine poverty are numerical variables when most of the 
time we find ourselves in the presence of categorical variables. On the other hand, the 
variables used are often inappropriate when we think about multidimensional approaches to 
poverty.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The union method of unification consists on considering someone as being poor if that 
                                                          
7 http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/themes/poverty-and-
inequality.html#international-poverty-lines 
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person suffers from deprivations in at least one dimension of poverty. The problem in this 
case will be false positives, that is, there may be individuals suffering from privations in more 
than one of the dimensions of poverty not because they are necessarily poor, but because 
they have made bad choices in allocating their income (Alkire and Foster (2011)). 
On the other hand, an intersection approach considers as poor someone who suffers from 
privations in all dimensions. In this case the problem will be false negatives, that is, there 
may be several individuals who are not poor from the perspective of all poverty dimensions 
but are, in fact, in a situation of extreme poverty. According to this approach someone that 
looks apparently healthy, either being actually healthy or not, even considering that a part of 
how healthy we are depends on our genetic, even being extremely poor won’t be considered 
as so according to this approach (Alkire and Foster (2011)). 
For this reason, some authors resort to a cutoff level method, in which we consider as poor 
an individual who suffers from privations in K or more dimensions of poverty, being K part 
of the interval [1, (total of dimensions of poverty analyzed)].  
When classifying individuals, the authors study whether a given individual is in a situation of 
deprivation in respect to each individual poverty dimension and, in a second phase, they seek 
to measure how lasting and deep deprivation is, setting a threshold from which the individual 
can be considered poor in relation to each poverty dimension individually. The last phase of 
the process consists on analyzing the level of privations to which a given individual is subject, 
giving a weight to each one of them according to the influence on the individuals’ well-being. 
They have called this process “dual cutoff method” (Alkire and Foster (2011)). 
Some of the advantages of the process in question include the fact that the result is not 
influenced by improvements in well-being in categories in which the individual(s) did not 
suffer from any types of deprivation, contrary to what was happening in the one-dimensional 
approach. The fact that it allows us to analyze and to group lots of individuals on an 
individual basis and the fact that it allows us to group individuals according to their privations 
and thus ordering them according with their need of intervention (Alkire and Foster (2011)). 
2.3. U.B.I “SWOT” analysis 
Universal Basic Income’s topic was initially approached by Thomas Moore in 1516 in his 
book "Utopia", having been transversal to the History of Economic Thought. However, only 
in 1962 the idea of an u.b.i. such as it is currently mentioned was made explicit in the form 
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of a negative tax rate. Friedman (1962) suggested the introduction of a progressive tax rate 
as the one that is currently applied in most countries, but with the particularity that, for 
households with incomes below the minimum threshold set for income, the tax rate would 
be negative, that is, instead of the state charging a tax fee it would fill the remnant to ensure 
that all families had an income that allowed them to live with dignity. From that moment 
until today, several other economists, some of whom also Nobel prize’s winners, have been 
defending the implementation of this measure since, despite all efforts to eradicate poverty 
by promoting equity, such objectives remain unreachable. 
According to Browne and Immervoll (2017), less than 50% of those who are actively seeking 
employment are entitled to benefit from unemployment benefits and social inclusion income 
benefits. Besides being subjected to tight scrutiny, they are still looked at by the generality of 
society, that is, there is a lack of scope for all those in need that social security measures are 
unable to respond today. So this is an advantage in favor of universal basic income: it 
manages to respond to all, ensuring poverty is fully abolished, at least in theory. Another 
advantage presented by u.b.i. is that, since it has no restrictions, there is no need for 
governments to have to invest money to find out if a given individual should effectively 
benefit from a given transfer or if not, avoiding also the costs of monitoring him to know 
the evolution of his incomes. Even thought, at first glance it may seem inefficient for the 
state to give people money in a first moment to collect them under the form of taxes in a 
posterior moment, it is not. As we know taxes are settled on a progressive basis, so it is 
ensured that the value paid in taxes by the wealthiest classes exceeds u.b.i. transfer, while for 
the middle classes the amount paid is roughly equal to the value received and for the lower 
classes the value received is higher than the amount of taxes paid. 
Another advantage is that it ensures economic independence, avoiding, among others, 
marriages that are prolonged by convenience for an indefinite time, since now the man is not 
the only one who earns money for sure, or that workers are exploited by abuser bosses, since 
now they have lower financial pressure to accept highly dangerous or contemptuous tasks 
((Forget (2011) and Groeneveld, Tuma, and Hannan (1980)). 
According to Sabate (2018) this measure would be partially self-sustainable since, by 
replacing other existing measures, such as social inclusion income or unemployment benefit, 
it would not incur extra costs, since even if u.b.i. did not exist that money would have to be 
spent anyway. 
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According to Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), the advantages of such a measure are that 
money is fungible, that is, money can be exchanged for goods or even for money. Families 
are heterogeneous, so it is possible that the increase in welfare is higher for families when 
they receive this kind of transfer against the one observable when there is an attempt to 
increase people’s qualifications because we all have different abilities and, for some, 
schooling may not be the best option because expected wages may not pay off the number 
of years invested in education. 
In the disadvantages side, if the objective is not clearly defined, the existence of an u.b.i. can 
generate tax rates on the level of income enormously high, which is not desirable since it acts 
as a disincentive for people to participate in the labor market or can result in an individual 
transfer that does not even serve to cope with subsistence needs, which leaves those who 
effectively have very low incomes in a poverty situation. This is a disadvantage of u.b.i.: 
Whether its practical application is feasible. Also, according to Haushofer and Shapiro 
(2016), another disadvantage that may result from the application of an u.b.i. is related to the 
issue of incentives: for example if the u.b.i. results in an small positive net transfer (after 
deducing the required increase in taxes), then the decrease in the number of people willing 
to work in some positions can be explained due to the existence of a higher bargaining power 
that allows them not to be forced to accept poor work conditions. However, if that resultant 
net transfer is slightly higher than the optimum value it may cause reservation wages to 
increase above the firms’ maximum willingness to pay for a given position which will result 
in scarcity of labor for some specific tasks (Browne and Immervoll (2017)). 
Much of the criticisms that have been made to u.b.i. relate to the high amounts of money 
needed to sustain such a measure: even Bill Gates himself has come to say that "neither the 
United States are rich enough to allow people not to have to work” while other personalities 
claim that the amount spent on this measure should be applied at the education or health 
levels, since improvements in social welfare are greater with investment been made in these 
areas when compared with u.b.i. investment’s returns. 
To the extent of this problem, Andrade (2015) comes with an innovative solution: taxing 
data used by large computer multinationals. The author's view is that it is possible to increase 
revenues based on an increase in the burden of taxes on large multinationals that, through 
data manipulation, can control our economy. According to him, a fee on the use of our data 
paid by those who profit from them would allow us to generate the necessary revenue to 
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support an u.b.i. in addition to representing a fair compensation to us all for seeing our 
personal information disclosed. 
The existence of a digital economy implies that part of our data is absorbed by the large 
multinationals not with our consent, but simply because we use information and 
communication technologies. This idea gets an higher importance if we consider that "data 
is the maximum externality: whatever we do we generate them.", as it is stated by Paul 
Sondereger, Oracle’s strategist.                                                                
Moreover, a particularity of this digital economy is the "network effect" that causes an 
increase in the number of followers of a social network, for example, to make this social 
network more attractive, which leads to the number of followers increasing more and more, 
which combined with the existent oligopolies result in really high levels of profit (Andrade 
(2015). 
Initially, large companies used data obtained to make their service more attractive at the eyes 
of their potential consumers. However, as time passes, they realized that data, unlike the 
great growth booster of the last century oil, has the advantage of possessing the property of 
non-rivalry, that is, even though a company is using data that does not prevent another 
company from being able to use that same data too.  
The basic idea behind a patent is its owner to be able to benefit from a unique or original 
idea, which has value or capacity of generate value, in which we spend a given amount of 
time and effort.                                                                                                     
Although most people do not realize, data is very valuable, so we should be rewarded for 
those data fairly and not through the current method in which we exchange data through 
access to a social network for example.                                                                                                                                                                           
Thus, if such measure is applied, it is ensured that u.b.i. is not intended for people who did 
nothing for society, since they gave up their data; that governments have the capacity to 
accommodate this measure, since the large multinationals that manage our data will pay and 
even that there is greater fairness between our exchanges with the major technological 
multinationals (Andrade(2015)).  
Another disadvantage of u.b.i. is that it annihilates the action of automatic stabilizers. As 
everyone receives the income regardless of whether they are employed or not the stimulus 
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action that the unemployment benefit usually has in the negative phase of the economic cycle 
ceases to exist (Browne and Immervoll (2017)). 
Schneider (2017) argues that most people tend to forget the adjustments that will result from 
the introduction of an u.b.i.. According to him, the results will be an increase in tax evasion, 
since the increase in the tax burden will increase the incentive to evade taxes, mass 
migrations, since there will be many people trying to get into countries that have an u.b.i. just 
to beneficiate from it, avoiding the need to work. This can make the measure even more 
unsustainable and that, having everyone access to an extra income, of course the demand 
will increase, which will increase prices and therefore increase inflation, and can annihilate 
real effects on actual yields.               
According to the author, most people faced with such a high tax burden will not benefit 
from the introduction of an u.b.i., on the contrary it is possible for some people the available 
income will decrease substantially. Thus, according to him, the effect will never be universal, 
idea also sustained by Sabate (2018). 
According to Sabate (2018), one of the major u.b.i.’s failures will be that its calculation is not 
as easy as it appears, since the expenses of an adult, an elderly person or a child have little 
correlation, but above all that, while an adult has full capacity to manage his extra earnings, 
for a child or even an elderly person the same will no longer be true, and these u.b.i.’ issues 
must be taken into account. 
According to Ravallion (2019), apart from the issue of advantages and disadvantages, 
particularly with regard to the underdeveloped world, but not only, there may be many 
obstacles in particular with regard to the transmission of information, since sometimes the 
poorer population does not have access to information technologies. Another obstacle not 
to be forgotten is that, generally, in poorer areas, whether developed or not, there is a trend 
for the emergence of usurers, that is, people who make loans to desperate individuals with 
high interest rates and that, in the face of implementation of such measure, would see much 
of its power disappearing, which may lead to heavy resistance to the implementation of the 
measure. 
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3. Empirical Case Studies 
Moving from the theoretical part to the empirical one, it has been observable that u.b.i’s 
experiences are becoming more and more common either because it is politically attractive 
to give money to everyone, so politicians are interested in discovering whether u.b.i. is 
feasible or not, or because of the band waggon effect that states that, as politicians like to 
being seen doing things, the moment when a political measure becomes fashionable they all 
want to try to implement it. The fact that u.b.i. is a compromise and not a commitment is 
also important because it reduces the risk of such a measure being implemented because it 
will not affect political cycles. It is worth mentioning however that on the one hand u.b.i. 
measures tend to benefit politicians, but on the other hand political commitment is important 
because these experiences cost money, require expertise in management to achieve their 
purposes and need some legislation in favour to be made feasible. 
Below, in this section, there will be presented some experiences conducted in countries such 
as Canada, United States of America, Ecuador India or Kenya, conceptualizing the 
parameters followed in the selection of the net recipients as well as the conclusions regarding 
a series of social issues.  
3.1. Canada’s case 
3.1.1. Manitoba’s experience 
Experience’s conceptualization: 
As it is brought to us by Simpson, Mason, and Godwin (2017), the experience of Manitoba, 
a province located in Canada, was carried out during 1975 and 1978 and consisted on 
observing how people's behaviors were affected by the introduction of a negative tax rate, 
one of the forms of application of a universal basic income, initially suggested by Economics’ 
Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman. 
In the genesis of this experience, there is an increase in the importance given to issues related 
to poverty and crisis associated with the fact that oil, the big engine of the economy, was 
found not to be a renewable resource, which in association with political tensions observed 
in the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries led the prices of 
this raw material to increase hugely, which plunged, among other countries extremely 
dependent on oil, the US and Canada in a crisis situation. The objectives of the experiment 
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were two essentially: to analyze the consequences resulting from the implementation of an 
alternative social welfare promotion system, examining the effects occurring on the labor 
supply side and, on the other side, to analyze the main challenges associated with such a 
measure, by inferring about its feasibility.                                                                                                                                  
Following a plan previously defined by other authors, the selected groups were mostly 
composed of people with few incomes from both Winnipeg, Manitoba’s capital, and other 
rural areas. Part of these families who were entitled to receive this type of transfer saw this 
measure being applied to them (treatment group) while to the remaining nothing was given 
so that they could function as a control group. The exception to this treatment was the case 
of Dauphin, a more concentrated population, in which all members who had a lower income 
level than the minimum threshold set could benefit from the measure, as a way of testing the 
effects of an effective universal income in a given population. It should also be noted that 
the level of income per capita previously observed determined the (negative) tax rate to which 
families were subjected.                                                                                                                                                  
As the measure in question was used in the logic of a form of partial universal basic income 
rather than a total u.b.i., articulation with other measures became essential, so income 
obtained via other transfers such as unemployment benefit or pensions were deducted from 
the initial value provided by the measure, which is why families were followed three times a 
year during the experiment. It is also necessary to highlight that, even if the income was 
subject to a negative tax rate, the heritage, that is, the aggregate set of assets and goods, was 
only exempt from the rate up to a value of $3000, and the tax rate was progressive from that 
moment on. The experiment was abandoned after three years. 
Empirical Findings:                                                                          
Regarding this experience conducted in the 70s (recovered later by Simpson et al. (2017)), 
Hum and Simpson (1993) concluded that the overall effect of Mincome (name that was given 
to the project in question) on the labor supply was insignificant both for the husband, the 
wife or for an unmarried woman when controlled the period of occurrence of the 
observations. They found that women who had just recently become mothers were the group 
for which the number of hours worked decreased the most, that is, the variable that had the 
most impact was the existence or not of small children in the analyzed household. Both Hum 
and Simpson (1993) as later Forget (2011) concluded that the main impact on the labor 
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market occurred because people from the tertiary sector have decided to invest in human 
capital and, what caused a postponement in their entrance in the labor market. This way it 
was allowed for people with fewer resources to reduce the pressure related to the need of 
earning money as soon as possible, that is, it was possible to ensure they had the same level 
of opportunity in relation to the others, so not only has poverty decreased but it has also 
generated equity. 
Groeneveld et al. (1980), in respect to previously mentioned Manitoba experience, concluded 
that the existence of an extra income caused the number of divorces to increase substantially 
more in the group in which interventions occurred in relation to the control group. 
According to them, the result obtained may not always be the marital dissolution’s response 
in relation to the introduction of an u.b.i.. Roughly speaking, there are two effects that must 
be considered: on the one hand, the independence effect, which leads to the fact that, now, 
within a given marriage, either party is not dependent on the other hence the receivable 
income is independent of the marital status, which generates an incentive for marriage 
dissolution. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider the income effect, since sometimes 
one of the reasons presented for the dissolution of a marriage is that the couple’s head is not 
able to earn enough to give his family a decent life and, enforced by shame and social stigma, 
abandons the relationship.  
The relationship between poverty and lack of health is generally known, either arising from 
the absence of conditions existing in houses or arising from the existence of moderating fees. 
Marmot, Allen, and Goldblatt (2010) go even further in their analysis stating that, for two 
populations in all equal except in one parameter: equity, it is verified that the one with the 
higher level of equity will have the higher level of health as well. According to Forget (2011), 
the existence of an u.b.i. will increase the incomes of poorer households, which improves 
the health level of a population. If the moderating rates are progressive it will lead to a higher 
level of equity between higher and lower incomes. Through another channel, the risk 
channel, the existence of an extra income will lead to a lower subjection of people to more 
dangerous activities, so the number of work accidents or the health consequences arising 
from someone working in degrading work conditions will be lower. Based on this theory, it 
is not surprising that when the author estimates her regression, the conclusion is that the 
introduction of Mincome led to the number of hospitalization ratios to drop by 8,5% and 
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the number of people admitted due to problems related to mental health to fall also 
significantly.  
Simpson et al. (2017), observing the growing interest in conducting pilot experiences of 
assigning a universal basic income, analyze the effects of the first experience of this type to 
be carried out, the experience of Manitoba.                                                                                                                                       
First, based on the results obtained, the authors tried to eliminate the resulting effect of the 
fact that, because of the famous oil crises as well as the crisis of Yom Kippur in 1973, which 
resulted in an oil embargo on the part of the Arab countries towards the other countries, 
inflation levels were continually increasing.                                                                                                          
According to the authors, linked to the failure of this project may have been several factors 
resulting from the idea being put into practice for the first time, namely a serious budgetary 
drift, since initially the project was supposed to cost 17 million dollars. However, partly due 
to the hyperinflationary context the value that was invested in the experience either with the 
values that were given through u.b.i. form, either through the costs of hiring about 200 
people generated estimated expenditures of 85 million dollars, that is, about 50000 dollars 
per participant, which raises some doubts about the feasibility of the project. On the other 
hand, it was also observed that a deviation occurred in relation to the initial motivations of 
the study, which may have partially contributed to the observed budgetary drift. Another 
identified issue is related to the fact that technical difficulties have arisen with the analysis 
and documentation of data concerned, which led to the availability of the results obtained 
with the experience only being available for about six years after the end of it. Finally, and 
because of the project having lost interest, the largest financier excluding Canada’s state has 
given up, what made the project even more unsustainable. 
A possible project to implement a measure in a similar homework was also abandoned in the 
decade of 1980, since the US and Canada entered the so-called "golden age" characterized 
by plenty of abundance, great GDP growth, very low levels of unemployment and, as so 
poverty was no longer a theme in vogue. It may also have contributed the fact that the results 
concluded that, in a recent future, it would not be possible to implement such a measure in 
a generalized way. A clear proof of the failure of this project is that little literature has been 
drafted based on its results.                              
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It should be noted, however, that the storage of information in to Excel databases, easier to 
consult and the availability of the results of the experience without restrictions online led to 
a project rebirth. 
3.2. United States of America’s case  
3.2.1. Alaska’s experience 
Experience’s conceptualization: 
As it is pointed out by Berman (2018), in Alaska, in 1976, during a time of greater abundance 
a considerable portion of the revenues obtained from oil sales was saved in a fund, and the 
gains obtained with interest distributed among the population who lived in Alaska for at least 
6 months at the time the transfer takes place.                                                                                                         
The amount that ought to be distributed by Alaska’s population was called "Permanent fund 
dividend" (PFD). It is important to emphasize that as one of the necessary requirements for 
an u.b.i. to be viable is to have a legal background, the existence of this fund, and the right 
to access it is defined in the Constitution. Regarding the latest data we can see that in 2017 
the value of the fund totalized about 60 billion USD, that is, about 80000 USD per capita, 
having been distributed about 1100 USD per capita in 2017, that is, about 692844900 USD 
in 20178.                                                                                                                                              
Being a fund, there are still some associated risks such as the interest rate risk and the inflation 
rate risk, which causes returns to suffer from a great volatility. To mitigate the inflation rate 
risk, about half of the annual gains obtained with the fund are reinvested, being only the 
remainder distributed over the form of dividends. About the interest rate risk, it is not 
possible to mitigate it which helps to explain why the amount distributed per capita varies 
without a necessary connection to the growth economic cycle.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
However, currently, in Alaska, per capita GDP remains only about half of the American per 
capita GDP, with an employability rate of just over 50%. Schools continue to appear in the 
lowest percentile in terms of results and a large part of Native population (which represents 
about 1/6 of the total) continues to reside in extremely rural areas, sometimes without links 
to urban centers. 
                                                          
8 Permanent Fund Dividend Division, Annual Report 2017- State of Alaska, Department of Revenue 
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Empirical Findings: 
Berman (2018) analyses the effects of introducing an u.b.i. in the Alaskan region, a 
predominantly rural region, to see how the measure came to mitigate the effects of poverty. 
The conclusions show that, without the existence of this u.b.i., the percentage of poor in 
Alaska would pass from the current 9.1% to 11.4%. Although at first glance the reduction 
does not seem very significant, when we truncated the sample to one that contains only those 
more sensitive to poverty, that is, Alaska’s natives (who were underrepresented in the total 
sample given that they only represent 1/6 of the total population), we found that the 
difference observed would make the current percentage of poor of 17.2% to increase to 
22.5%, that is, a difference of 5.3 percentage points.                                                                                                                                                                     
It is also important to analyze that income has a very important effect both when it comes 
down to native children (of whom 24.8% are poor and otherwise would be poor 32.9%) as 
when it comes down to the native elderly (of whom 7.6% are poor and otherwise would be 
13.3%).                                                                                                                                                                                    
The downside of this study, however, arises when we compare poverty reduction in marginal 
terms and come to the conclusion that, over the years, the income offered each time 
withdraws a lower percentage of people from poverty, having reached its maximum in 2000, 
when the level of poor Alaskan natives decreased from 22.4% to 12.6%, that is a reduction 
of 11.8 percentage points or almost 44%. Between 2011 and 2015, the percentage of natives 
who were no longer poor due to this income was less than 25% (without income 22.5% of 
the natives would be poor while when u.b.i. was applied the poor natives represented only 
17.2% of the total, a reduction of 5.3 percentage points).                            
When we seek to divide the households according to their composition, we conclude that 
this measure had more impact in the case of couples with a child or more than one child, 
observing for both cases reductions of about 7.0 percentage points due to the introduction 
of the permanent income. Once again, the conclusions also point towards a lower measure’s 
effectiveness, since the variations in the percentage of poor natives in rural areas in 2000 (the 
year in which the effectiveness was higher) had been 20.5 percentage points for households 
with a child and 13.5 percentage points for households with more than one child, which 
corresponds to an ability to withdraw more than 50% of these poverty households. 
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Regarding the criticism around the universal basic income as a measure of fighting poverty, 
it was found that there was only a reduction in the number of working hours in the case of 
married women and young adults, and even so a reduction though not very significant, being 
even compensated by the productivity obtained through work at home for the women’s case. 
In the case of young adults, it was observed that the levels of schooling increased, which is 
why they entered later in the labor market, however, their productivity has increased too, 
which has compensated the mentioned above effect.   
Finally, it was also possible to conclude that the productive investment made because of the 
additional income more than offset the expenses with u.b.i.                                                                             
It is interesting to note that the empirical evidence pointed to the absence of a substitution 
effect, that is, there is only the existence of an income effect, and what happens is that people 
now manage to maintain higher levels of consumption with the same number of hours of 
work.                                                                                                                                                                                   
Last but not the least, regarding the possibility of this extra income being used in deviant 
activities, the results showed that there were no significant differences in the consumption 
patterns observed for Alaska and those observed in the remaining 49 states.  
Variations in performance effectiveness can be explained by two paths: On the one hand, 
the percentage that the Permanent Fund Income represents in inhabitant’s total income 
declined and, on the other hand, the economic crisis caused many native incomes to fall to 
values even lower than the defined poverty threshold. Another argument is that, according 
to the rules of the United States, a couple who is not married counts as two households 
rather than just one.                             
The conclusion is that Permanent Fund Income has made it possible to significantly reduce 
poverty levels, particularly regarding cases of children and the older population. However, 
since it has only mitigated poverty rather than eradicating it, we conclude that this is an 
efficient measure not of a total universal basic income, but of a partial universal basic income, 
which must continue to be complemented with other alternative measures. 
3.3. Ecuador’s case 
Experience’s conceptualization: 
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According to Hidrobo, Peterman, and Heise (2016), in Ecuador, it has been observable that 
the indexes of violence against women tend to be very high both in the case of Ecuador 
natives as in the case of Colombian refugees. As this theme is becoming more and more 
important, the World Food Programme (WFM) has implemented a “Cash, food and 
voucher” program in Northern Ecuador in areas with a high number of Colombian refugees 
that started in April 2011 and ended at September 2011. Seven urban centres were considered 
being the eligible beneficiaries selected based on criteria such as the existence of institutions 
available to provide such resources to its beneficiaries, a high number of Colombian refugees 
(at least 10%) and poor populations (poverty index above 50%). To those who were selected 
as eligible it was distributed around 40 dollars a month per household. 
Empirical findings: 
According to Hidrobo et al. (2016), the existence of an u.b.i. measure applied in Ecuador in 
2011 lead to a decrease between 6 and 7 percentage points in the probability of a woman 
being controlled by her husband or subjected to violence by him. Another interesting 
conclusion is that the results achieved through this measure were not statistically different 
from those obtained through in-kind transfers. This measure increased women's 
argumentation power as well as the distribution of tasks at home level, which made the 
relations more egalitarian and reduced the stress levels associated with poverty risk, which 
might be the explanation for the observed decrease in violence.  
3.4. India’s case 
Experience’s conceptualization: 
As Standing (2012) points out, in India, an important part of the population is in favor of 
delivering subsidies to food producers while another party is in favor of the existence of 
monetary transfers. However, both solutions have faced a large chorus of criticism, from 
risks of an even greater level of corruption or unsustainability to the possibility of producing 
lower quality foods or widespread cuts in public services, being the only evidence observed 
that about 30% of India's population was still in extreme poverty. For this reason, UNICEF 
has created a program that, in 8 villages of Madhya, guaranteed to all adults an income of 
200 rupees per month, plus an extra 100 rupees per month per child, later increased to 300 
rupees in the case of adults and 150 rupees in the case of children, following also the results 
observed for 12 other villages where such measure has not been implemented. To test if it 
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was important that the beneficiaries have institutional representation for the measure to work 
in its fullness, it was ensured that in half of the villages this representation existed while in 
the others it didn´t.          
To avoid bias, half of the villages in which the transfer occurred and half of the villages in 
which these transfers did not occur were randomly selected.                                              
Empirical Findings: 
Standing (2012) analyzes the impact of basic unilateral monetary transfers made by UNICEF 
in some villages in Madhya, in India. The findings observed were that the existence of an 
u.b.i. made it possible for a large part of the households to use that money to fight against 
malaria and to reinforce the hygiene and safety conditions in their homes, to improve their 
food conditions, with a widespread increase in children’s weight. Thus, contrary to what is 
foreseen by critics, the existence of an additional income did not result in deviant behavior. 
It was also observed that the attendance and the results obtained by children in schools 
improved significantly, either due to better nutrition or due to better teaching conditions. 
There was an approximation between the incomes of women, disabled persons or single 
parents, the most probable candidates to face poverty in comparison with the remaining 
population’s income. In fact, there was a large reduction in the number of loans required, 
and the only people to feel harmed were the lenders who worked in the region and demanded 
very high interest (5%/month), and thus it was also possible to reduce the levels of 
corruption.                                                                               
There was also a great growth in the level of investment at a small scale, a growth in 
productivity and, against the prospects of critics, an increase in the number of working hours, 
although there has also been a significant increase in the number of self-employed people. It 
is important to emphasize that this measure has benefited women more than men, which 
makes it possible to counterbalance the wage gap between genders.                                                                                                                                                                                          
In short, u.b.i. and its results in India are a good example of the celebrated principle of 
gestaltism that tells us that "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts" since, with just 
one measure it was possible to replicate a lot of other measures’ effects. 
3.5. Kenya’s case 
Experience’s conceptualization: 
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As Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) point out, in Kenya, between 2011 and 2013, through the 
program GD (give directly) were assigned in a first phase transfers of 404 dollars to randomly 
selected households from among those identified previously as being very poor. In a second 
phase it was attributed to 167 of the selected households another 1121 dollars, distributed 
by seven monthly installments.9 This is a good starting point to study the potential effects of 
an u.b.i. since the measure was in practice for a short time, but the amounts transferred were 
high, and the objectives were to observe whether there were changes in consumption 
patterns, as well as whether there were changes in the health, education, access to food, and 
gender equality levels.                                                                                    
Empirical Findings: 
Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) analyze the effects from the introduction of an u.b.i. in Kenya. 
Nine months after the program started it was observed that the average monthly 
consumption increased 36 dollars, which, compared to the average observed before GD, 
corresponds to an increase of about 23%. As regards the consumption of tobacco and 
alcohol, no significant effects were observed, and the large part of the income was spent on 
investments that were profitable, and that led the level of revenues extracted from 
agriculture, livestock and industry to increase from 49 monthly dollars to 65 per month, an 
increase of almost 33%, with the households diversifying their sources of income, which 
allows us to conclude that GD did not cause dependence. The negative part regarding the 
u.b.i.’s impact was that the level of expenditure increased also, which minimized the effects 
of the increase observed at the revenues’ level. Furthermore, there were no significant 
differences in the levels of education and health. Although, regarding this last point, it was 
observed that the prevalence of mental illnesses decreased and that the levels of happiness 
increased in a statistically significant percentage. 
Besides the mentioned costs of providing people with u.b.i., some other costs must be 
considered: the costs of selecting the families that will receive such amounts and the costs of 
conducting the referred study, let’s call them operational costs. In large transfers (1525USD), 
operational costs accounted only for an extra 168 USD while on the case of small transfers 
(404USD), operational costs accounted for an extra 92 USD, so the project’s feasibility was 
never at risk. 
                                                          
9 Calculated values assuming the PPP set by the World Bank of 0.016 USD/KES  
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3.6. A different experience: Finland’s case 
Experience’s conceptualization: 
Regarding the u.b.i.’s topic in the latest years, the experience that has capture the higher level 
of media attention is the one that has occurred in Finland between the years of 2017 and 
2018.  
Finland has chosen to implement an u.b.i. because, as it is common to most of the developed 
countries, their social security system was facing high levels of pressure. As so the finnish 
government was trying to test whether a model based on an u.b.i. could avoid so much 
bureaucracy costs and such a waste of time achieving the same goals, that is, to try to fight 
against poverty. 
According to the report The basic income experiment 2017-2018 in Finland, Preliminary results, 
published in 2019 in Helsinki by the ministry of social affairs and health, the basic income 
amount was settled at 560 euros per month per individual, that is, the finnish government 
has chosen a partial u.b.i., requiring this measure to be complemented with other accessory 
measures. The value was not randomly chosen however: it corresponded to the 
unemployment benefit provided by finnish social security system. 
Based on this idea, 2000 individuals between 25 and 58 years old who beneficiated from such 
income in the year before were selected10. On the one hand, this way it is ensured that there 
are no problems regarding the beneficiaries’ capability to manage such income (the elderly 
and the youngest cannot do as so). Nonetheless, on the other hand it generates a problem: 
in order for anyone to benefit from such transfer it ought to have worked in the past and 
not to be working in the present, that is, this experience would have two bias: on the one 
hand it would only be provided the transfer to unemployed people, and worse, it would 
require that someone has already worked in the past, that is, it would not ever be universal, 
since it would be imposed a serious restriction. Finally, there is another even more complex 
problem: the unemployment benefit in Finland, as in most countries, is means tested11, that 
is, the amount you receive will be a function of how much you earn. The result will be that 
all the pre-selected individuals will be approximately on the same range of income so there 
                                                          
10 The basic income experiment 2017–2018 in Finland Preliminary Results 
11 For more details consult: https://www.kela.fi/web/en/labour-market-subsidy-is-means-tested 
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will be a truncation for the results obtained in the case of the poorer population, for example. 
The problem that arises from here is that, regarding the observable characteristics we may 
still be able to compare the control group with the treatment group. However, when we think 
about the non-observable characteristics, that is, their ability, the same cannot be said. The 
fact is that nowadays jobs begin requiring higher and higher levels of education and it is 
worth mentioning pay higher wages the higher are the qualifications, ceteris paribus, on average, 
because schooling level is seen as a signal of potential. However, there is a problem: some 
people cannot learn as fast as the others, that is, for them a higher level of schooling will not 
pay off either because they will take years before achieving it or either because they are not 
able to achieve it at all. As firms are looking for more qualified people these less qualified 
individuals will not be able to access to a wide range of jobs and will be more likely to become 
unemployed (Leigh & Ryan, 2008). Thus, it is natural that the ability level between the control 
group and the treatment group are statistically significantly different.  
Despite all the criticisms that were made towards the conceptualization of this experience, 
the achieved results still have a huge importance hence that the experience was extended to 
all the individuals that have met all the requirements and not only to a few of them as most 
experiences made so far. This way it is possible to compare the same groups of individuals 
in two different moments in time. As the experiment has been made compulsory to all the 
selected individuals, the control group ought to be chosen using other criteria: in this case 
there were randomly selected 5000 individuals from the total of 173222 who have received 
an unemployment benefit from Kela, the finnish social security system, in November of 
2016, independently of their age or transfer amount received (excluding of course the 
treatment group).  
It is always worth mentioning that the control group and the treatment group were 
approximately similar regarding their observable characteristics. The main differences are 
related to the fact there were on average higher number of children per household and the 
households were larger for the treatment group. This can be related to the fact that, even 
considering that there are not significant differences between the two groups concerning the 
individuals age distribution, the treatment group has excluded individuals over 58 years old 
while the control group has not. The experience has come to an end because the finnish 
government was not willing to spend more money trying to increase the number of people 
that would receive u.b.i.’s transfers.  
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Empirical Findings:                                                                                                                      
Regarding unemployment duration it is possible to conclude that the existence of an u.b.i. 
has not caused unemployment duration to increase, at least not in a statistically significant 
amount. 
As to the extent concerning the agents trusts regarding other people it was observable that, 
on average, ceteris paribus, u.b.i’s net recipients trusted more in other people and in politicians 
when compared to the control group. In the same line of thought, the results revealed that, 
ceteris paribus, on average, the levels of self-confidence, the expectations towards the future 
and the health perception have increased more for the treatment group when compared to 
the control group.  Moreover, the treatment group has also report to have experienced, on 
average, less stress and a higher ability to concentrate. 
However, the most important conclusions were the fact that the u.b.i.’s net recipients have 
reported to have a higher incentive to accept a full-time job in the case they were working 
part-time or to accept a job offer in the case they were unemployed and the fact that the 
perception of the agents towards the level of bureaucracy involved is also positive, which 
proves that the experience managed to achieve the two goals defined by the finnish 
government. 
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4. Revisiting the Manitoba’s experience: An econometric approach 
The purpose of this section is to estimate regressions using the data of the first u.b.i. 
experience ever realized, in Manitoba, between 1973 and 1974. These thesis’ regressions will 
be based on such experience because it is the one that provides extensive data without any 
restrictions and because the experience as a result of being the first u.b.i.’s trial was 
considered as a failure (Hum and Simpson (1993)). 
The main goal with such econometric analysis is to test to what extent the variables response 
to the introduction of an u.b.i. in such experience have led to the results that theoretical 
models predict. In order to evaluate this experience (“Mincome” as it was called) individuals 
answered a survey with a lot of questions regarding income, family composition, job situation 
or individual points of view regarding some key society aspects, such as how they evaluate 
their situation when compared with the rest of the population or their position regarding 
whether all jobs are worthy or not. All the participants, regardless of being in the control 
group or in the treatment group, participated in the survey. Following that survey data were 
set with a considerable time delay in an Excel file and, now that the u.b.i. topic has become 
more popular, they were placed online in the Manitoba’s University so that everyone can 
have access to it. The original survey had over 100 key questions, however along this thesis 
there will be an attempt to keep the models as simple as possible in order to make its analysis 
simpler.  
The key questions that this thesis will try to answer will be what is the effect of an u.b.i. in 
the number of weeks worked, differentiating such effects both for male heads as for female 
heads, and in poverty levels, this thesis’ main topic. As there are no direct indicators that 
allow to see Mincome’s effects regarding poverty levels, there will be used two proxy 
variables to access such effects. In this line of thought, it will be analyzed what was the effect 
of such transfer on the probability that the male head decided to enroll in school, comparing 
with the probability of the same situation to occur with the female head, as well as the effects 
regarding job satisfaction for both the female and the male heads. Regarding schooling 
attendance, the reason why this variable is important is because it is easily understandable: 
the decision for someone to attend a further level of schooling has an opportunity cost of 
not earning any money during that period that some families are not able to support. As to 
what concerns job satisfaction, as it was previously mentioned, a poverty situation causes 
people to accept poor work conditions, that often involve job exploitation situations, which 
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decreases job satisfaction levels and it was also shown that poverty causes a pressure on 
people that often increases the probability of people developing mental illnesses (Forget 
(2011)). Regarding the effects on the number of weeks worked it is intended to check if there 
is a statistically significant decrease in the number of hours worked as a result of people 
beneficiating from a u.b.i. and if such effect is the same for both male heads as for female 
heads because it is commonly said that u.b.i. provides higher independence levels. Regarding 
schooling levels, the goal is to see if the existence of such u.b.i. causes the number of people 
enrolled in school to increase and this thesis’ goal is also to find out if that effect occurs for 
both genders or only for one of them. Regarding job exploration, this thesis will use the 
variable satisfaction as a proxy of work conditions: the goal here is to see whether the 
introduction of an u.b.i. was responsible for people to become more pleased with their jobs, 
that is, if the extra money margin has allowed them to choose the jobs that suit the best for 
them.  
4.1. Data description 
To compute these regressions, there was the need to rename some variables and to create 
some others based on the interaction between the variables that were listed in the Manitoba’s 
University database. Considering what the goals are, in this section we present a set of 
detailed descriptive statistics on the variables of interest. 
Types of households: From the total of households enrolled in this experience only 1223 
of them had both a female head and a male head (DHEAD). As to the others, 539 
households were only constituted by a single individual (SINGIND) while the remnant 394 
were formed by a single head but with more members (SHEAD) (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Types of households 
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It becomes important to mention that the number of households with just a female head is 
much higher than the number of households with just a male head. In fact, Figure 2 allows 
us to see the differences existent: there are only 40 households with only a male head but 
there are 354 households with just a female head. Also, there are 334 single headed 
households with a female head and only 205 households with a male head (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 – Single heads and single individuals by gender 
AGEM: From the total of households enrolled in the experience there were 1468 male heads. 
Most of them (987) were between 25 and 54 years old, 328 were between 15 and 24 years 
old. The remaining 153 were over 55 years old. It is also worth mentioning the eldest male 
head was 74 years old while the youngest was 18 years old (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 – Distribution of male heads by main age groups 
AGEF: From the total of households enrolled in the experience there were 1911 female 
heads. Most of them (1230) were between 25 and 54 years old, 543 were between 15 and 24 
years old. The remaining 138 were over 55 years old. It is also worth mentioning the eldest 
female head was 65 years old while the youngest was 15 years old (see figure 4). 
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Figure 4 – Distribution of female heads by main age groups 
FAMSIZE: There were enrolled in this experience households formed by single individuals 
up to households formed by 12 people, being the average household formed by 3 people. 
The standard deviation is 2 people which indicates us that the sample is widely disperse (see 
figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 – Distribution of households by total number of members 
Age0to5: There were enrolled in this experience households constituted by no young 
children up to households with 5 young children having the average household no young 
children. In this case the sample is clearly biased towards the right side, that is, there are only 
few families with over 1 young child (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6 – Distribution of households by number of children aged between 0 and 5 years old 
Age6to15: There were enrolled in this experience households constituted by no children up 
to households with 8 children having the average household one children. The sample is 
clearly biased towards the right side, that is, there are only few families with over 1 child (see 
figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 – Distribution of households by number of children aged between 6 and 15 years old 
Age16M: There were enrolled in this experience households constituted by no adult besides 
the head adults to households with 5 adults besides the head adults having the average 
household no adult besides the head adult. In this case the sample is clearly biased towards 
the right side, that is, there are only few families with over 1 extra adult besides the head 
adults (see figure 8). 
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Figure 8 – Distribution of households by number of non-head adults 
FAMINCT: Figure 9 presents the family income’s distribution between 1973 and 1974 
range from 0 dollars to 85379 dollars, excluding Mincome’s tranfers. However, as we can see 
the sample is extremely biased to the right so there is no surprise when we observe the 
average family income was around 11176 dollars per year (see Figure 9). 
   
Figure 9 – Family income dispersion 
MHINC: Across our sample we have incomes for the male head ranging from no income 
to 28795 USD per year. The sample is clearly biased towards the right, so it is only natural 
the average male head income is 8553 dollars (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 – Male head income distribution 
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FHINC: Across our sample we have incomes for the female head ranging from no income 
to 22516 USD per year. The sample is clearly biased towards the right, so it is only natural 
the average female head income is 2569 dollars, much lower than the male head’s average 
income (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 – Female head income distribution 
Treat: In this experience there were analysed households who were very heterogeneous 
among themselves. As so there was the need to group them in several categories. There were 
created 10 categories of households: those who were not entitled no transfer at all, 8 
categories with households who were entitled different values of Mincome and finally one 
category for households who should receive some transfer but did not so that they could 
work as a control group. These data show us that most of the individuals were not entitled 
any transfer, 514 because they were not entitled to, while the remnant 442 worked as a 
control group.  It can also be observed that a transfer of 7600USD before family size index 
correction was by far the most common, even though there was a smaller transfer defined. 
This happened because one of the main requirements for an u.b.i. policy to work is that the 
transfer is large enough so that people can stop being poor.12 (see Figure 12). 
                                                          
12 For the same reason in 1974 the sixth tier that involved transfers of 5067 USD was eliminated and all the 
households who were in such tier passed to the seventh one, receiving 6400USD per year. 
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 Figure 12 – Type of treatment per household 
As households were very heterogeneous, a family size index was defined taking as a basis a 
family of four members with two children. The idea behind it was that not all families have 
the same needs, so for the transfer’s amount to be defined the correspondent family size 
index (that we can see in Figure 13) was multiplied by the previously defined treatment 
amount.  
 
Figure 13 – Family size index values 
Taking this table into account the variable that matters the most is Mincome, that is, to find 
how much exactly was the transfer each household received. 
Transfer: In this experience there were provided transfers to households ranging from no 
transfer provided at all to over 52936USD. However, this sample is widely biased to the right, 
so it is not strange that the mean transfer provided was around 8152 dollars. It is worth 
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notice that the index application has increased the average transfer value, what allows us to 
conclude that higher families were, on average, poorer families in Manitoba (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 – Distribution of amount received per household  
MHWEEK: From the total of male heads enrolled in this experience (1468), most of them 
worked all weeks during the 2 years. However, the second most representative group are 
males who have work almost no week or even no week at all during the 2 years. On average, 
a male head has worked 31 weeks per year (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15 – Average number of weeks worked per year for the male heads 
FHWEEK: From the total of female heads enrolled in this experience (1911), most of them 
have not worked a week per year on average. Nonetheless, the second most representative 
group are women who have worked all weeks during the 2 years. On average, a female head 
has worked 18 weeks (from the total of 52 that define a year) (see figure 16). 
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Figure 16 – Average number of weeks worked per year for the female heads 
MHJOBSAT: From the 1116 male heads who have worked at least one week in the past 2 
years almost half of them (537) report to feel somehow satisfied with their current jobs (tier 
2). The second higher tier is male heads who feel very satisfied with their current jobs (tier 
1). As so we can see that almost all male heads work and, at the same time, the higher amount 
of them feels, at least, partially satisfied with their jobs (see Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17 - Male head satisfaction with current job evaluated using a Likert scale 
FHJOBSAT: From the 916 female heads who have worked at least one week in the past 2 
years almost half of them (409) report to be somehow satisfied with their current jobs (tier 
2). The second higher tier is female heads who feel very satisfied with their current jobs (tier 
1). As so we can see that only a few female heads work but from, those who work, the 
majority feels at least partially satisfied with their current jobs (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18 - Female head satisfaction with current job evaluated using a Likert scale 
MHYSCH: Now when we analyse the 1468 male heads’ levels of schooling, even when 
considering the sample differences, we come down to the conclusion that men tend to be, 
on average, less schooled but, at the same time, tend to be the ones who have the highest 
number of post-secondary education attainment. Nonetheless over 25% of them have 
elementary schooling attainment levels. It cannot be seen in this graph, but the most schooled 
male head has 24 years of schooling having the average male around 9 years of schooling. 
FHYSCH: By analysing the 1911 female heads’ levels of schooling we come down to the 
conclusion that a higher number of them has been able to enrol in secondary schooling, 
whether completing or not. We can also see the number of women with only elementary 
schooling represents [314 1911⁄ =0,16]. It cannot be seen in this graph, but the most 
schooled female head has 19 years of schooling having the average female less than 9 years 
of schooling. 
 
Figure 19 – Distribution of male heads and female heads by levels of schooling 
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MHSCH: From the total of 1468 male heads surveyed, only 130 are currently enrolled in 
school, that is, approximately 8,88% of the total. 
FHSCH: From the total of 1911 female heads surveyed, only 123 are currently enrolled in 
school, that is, approximately 6,41% of the total. 
These results come in line with the previously analysed graphs, worth mentioning. 
In Annex 1, a detailed definition of all variables is presented while in annex 2 are presented 
the descriptive statistics for each variable. 
4.2. Testing the effect of an U.B.I. on the number of weeks worked 
4.2.1. Male head’s case 
To test the effect of an u.b.i. on the number of weeks worked by the male head we estimate 
the following model: 
𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐾𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟)𝑖 +⁡𝛽3 ∗ log⁡(𝑀𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶)𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗
log⁡(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑊𝑁𝑀𝐻)𝑖 +⁡𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                 
As it is presented in model 4.1., there were chosen six explanatory variables to estimate this 
model: the variable that interests the most, that is, the amount the household with a male 
head has received, the amount the male head earns because the more you earn the higher is 
the incentive for you to work (Marcos and Garcia (2012)), the amount the household is able 
to earn without the male head’s financial contribution, that is a proxy to show us how 
important the male head is financially speaking, the fact the male is currently enrolled in 
school or not, because being in school causes the individual’s time available to work to 
decrease, the household dimension because the greater the household the higher is the 
attention required on the male head to earn money and, finally, a dummy variable for the 
fact that there is a female head in the household because that decreases the pressure of being 
the only one who is able to earn money. The continuous variables were used in the 
logarithmic form because, that way, it is ensured that the econometric analysis becomes easier 
and that the results become more accurate. 
(4.1.) 
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Table 1 – Effect of u.b.i. on number of hours worked, OLS results for the male sample 
This model is statistically globally significant. This model’s 𝑅2⁡is 0,6266, that is, this linear 
regression computed with the defined variables can explain over 62% of the variations 
observed in the average number of weeks worked per year by the male head (MHWEEK) 
values. Taking into consideration that we are using only six explanatory variables we may 
consider these results to be satisfactory. Moreover, we can see that almost all variables are 
statistically significant for the conventional significance levels, what is also positive. 
According to the model, on average, ceteris paribus, an increase of one percent in the transfer 
made to households causes the number of weeks worked by the male head to decrease by 
0.000668 weeks. This coefficient is significant for significance levels of 5% and 10% so the 
regression shows us that Mincome has effectively caused a significant decrease in the number 
of weeks worked by male heads: the question is to see whether that effect was due to male 
heads staying longer in school, improving human capital, or not. 
Concerning the other variables, the observed effects were according to what was expected: 
The number of weeks worked will increase if the male head’s income is higher, because wages 
act as an incentive for people to work more (Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)), if the household 
has a higher number of members, which requires that the available household’s income needs 
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to be necessarily higher, thus forcing the male head to work more and if there is a female 
head because some males may feel threatened if they are not the main household earner 
(Tichenor (2005)). Also, as predicted, male head’s number of hours worked will decrease if 
the male head’s importance in family income is lower and if the male head is currently 
enrolled in school. 
4.2.2. Female head’s case 
To test the effect of an u.b.i. on the number of weeks worked by the female head we estimate 
the following model: 
𝐹𝐻𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐾𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟)𝑖 +⁡𝛽3 ∗ log⁡(𝐹𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶)𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗
log⁡(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑊𝑁𝐹𝐻)𝑖 +⁡𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝐻_𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                 
As we can see on model 4.2. we have used six explanatory variables in our regression’s 
estimation. It can be easily noted that the variables used were in line with the variables used 
for the male head’s case (see point 4.2.1.) so we will pass directly to the regression’s analysis.  
 
Table 2 – Effect of u.b.i. on number of hours worked, OLS results for the female sample 
This model is statistically globally significant. This model’s 𝑅2⁡is 0,6787, that is, this linear 
regression computed with the defined variables can explain almost 68% the average number 
(4.2.) 
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of weeks worked per year by the female head (FHWEEK) values. Taking into consideration 
that we are using only 6 explanatory variables we may consider these results to be satisfactory. 
Moreover, we can see that almost all variables are statistically significant for the conventional 
significance levels, what is also positive. However, the model has a huge down side: the 
variable that interests us the most, Transfer, that gives respect to the amount transferred 
from the government to the households, is not significant not even at 10%. 
According to the model, on average, ceteris paribus, an increase of one dollar in the Mincome 
amount causes the number of weeks worked by the female head to decrease by 0.0000243 
weeks. However, this variable has a p-value of 0,923 that is, it is not significant at all, so we 
conclude that Mincome doesn’t cause the number of hours female heads work to decrease 
significantly. 
Concerning the other variables, the observed effects were according to what was predicted: 
the number of weeks worked will increase if the female head’s income is higher, because 
wages act as an incentive for people to work more (Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)), if the 
household has a higher number of members, which requires that the available household’s 
income needs to be necessarily higher, thus forcing the female head to work more and if the 
female head’s financial importance in the household is lower. Also, as predicted, female 
head’s number of hours worked will decrease if the female head is currently enrolled in 
school and if the household has also a male head member (the reversal situation of Tichenor’s 
theory). 
4.3. Test Mincome’s effect regarding school attendance 
4.3.1. Male head’s case 
To test the effect of an u.b.i. on male head’s school attendance we estimate the following 
model: 
𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟)𝑖 +⁡𝛽3 ∗ log⁡(𝑀𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶)𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗
log⁡(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑊𝑁𝑀𝐻)𝑖 +⁡𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒0𝑡𝑜5𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒6𝑡𝑜15𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒16𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐷𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
     
(4.3.) 
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As it is presented in model 4.3., we have chosen seven explanatory variables: the variable that 
interests the most, that is, the amount the household with a male head has received, the 
amount the male head earns because the more you earn the lower is the incentive for you to 
stop working or to reduce your number of working hours, the amount the household is able 
to earn without the male’s head financial contribution, that is a proxy to show us how 
important the male head is financially speaking, the number of children as well as the 
correspondent age because the existence of young children causes the probability that 
someone enrols in school to decrease (Aslanian (1988) and Lin and Wang (2015)) and finally 
a dummy variable for the fact that there is a female head in the household because that 
decreases the pressure of being the only one who is able to earn money. 
 
Table 3 – Effect of u.b.i. on school enrolment, Probit results for the male sample 
This model is statistically globally significant. This model’s pseudo 𝑅2⁡is 0,1427, that is, this 
model can fit the data well. Taking into consideration that we are only using seven 
explanatory variables we may consider these results to be satisfactory.  
𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻 = 
= 
1  if  𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻∗ ≥0 
0 if  𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻∗ <0 
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As we are dealing with a probit model we know that each coefficient’s estimate gives only 
information regarding the sign of the effect on the probability of MHSCH=1. To obtain the 
magnitude of the effects associated to each explanatory variable we computed the average 
marginal effects (see Table 3). 
Most of the variables are significant for at least one of the conventional significance levels, 
which is a model’s pro side. Nonetheless, the variable that interest us the most, Transfer, 
isn’t significant for none of the above-mentioned situations, what is a model’s down side. 
According to the model, on average, ceteris paribus, an increase of 1% in the Mincome amount 
causes the probability that the male head enrols in school to increase by 0.08 percentage 
points. However, as we can see, the variable has a p-value around 0.2 which, despite not 
being statistically not significant at all, means that for the conventional significance levels the 
variable isn’t significant so we can’t state that the existence of an u.b.i. causes a significant 
increase in male’s schooling attendance. 
Concerning the other variables, most of the observed effects were according to what was 
predicted: The probability that the male head is currently enrolled in school will be higher if 
the family income without his wage is higher. On the other hand, such probability will be 
lower if the family has a higher number of members, that, as we have seen, results in a higher 
pressure for the male to need to earn money and if the household has 2 heads, according 
with Tichenor’s theory. 
Regarding the fact that a higher wage increases the probability of the male to enrol in school, 
both Aslanian (1988) (for master and doctor degrees’ study) as Lin and Wang (2015) provide 
a simple explanation: when people want to make the passage to top jobs, only available for 
those who were already in high positions, sometimes it is require that they improve their 
schooling levels. In fact, according to the authors, for males, the need for higher skills to 
have access to top positions is the main cause for school returning. 
4.3.2. Female head’s case 
To test the effect of an u.b.i. on female head’s school attendance we estimate the following 
model: 
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𝐹𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟)𝑖 +⁡𝛽3 ∗ log(𝐹𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶)𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗
log⁡(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑊𝑁𝐹𝐻)𝑖 +⁡𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒0𝑡𝑜5𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒6𝑡𝑜15𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒16𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐷𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
                       
As we can see on model 4.4. we have used seven explanatory variables in our regression’s 
estimation. It can be easily noted that the variables used were in line with the variables used 
for the male head’s case (see point 4.3.1.) so we will pass directly to the regression’s analysis.  
 
Table 4 – Effect of u.b.i. on school enrolment, Probit results for the female sample 
This model’s pseudo 𝑅2⁡is 0,1311, that is, this model can fit the data well. Taking into 
consideration that we are only using seven explanatory variables we may consider these 
results to be satisfactory.  
As we are dealing with a probit model we know that each coefficient’s estimate contains only 
information regarding the sign of the effect on the probability of FHSCH=1. To obtain the 
magnitude of the effects associated to each explanatory variable we must proceed to the 
computation of the average marginal effects (see Table 4). 
𝐹𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻 = 
= 
1  if  𝐹𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻∗ ≥0 
0 if  𝐹𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻∗ <0 
(4.4.) 
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All variables except one are significant for at least two of the three conventional significance 
levels, which is a model’s pro side. Nonetheless, the variable that interest us the most, 
Transfer, isn’t significant at all, which is a model’s huge down side. 
According to the model, on average, ceteris paribus, an increase of 1% in the Mincome amount, 
causes the probability that the female head enrols in school to increase by 0.00372 percentage 
points. However, this variable has a p-value of 0,943, which means it isn’t statistically 
significant at all so no economical conclusion can be taken from this model’s analysis. 
Concerning the other variables, most of the observed effects were according to what was 
predicted: The probability that the female head is currently enrolled in school will be higher 
if the family income not considering her own income is higher. On the other hand, such 
probability will decrease if the household has a great number of members and if the 
household has two heads, possibly for the same reason pointed out by Tichenor for men’s 
case. 
Regarding the fact that a higher wage increases the probability that a female head chooses to 
enrol in school the explanation provided by Aslanian (1988) and Lin and Wang (2015) also 
holds: despite the fact the existence of a glass ceiling effect that doesn’t seem to allow women 
to achieve top jobs (Bukstein and Gandelman (2019), women are able to have access to those 
jobs by presenting higher qualifications than the ones the position they are applying to 
demands (Castagnetti, Rosti, and Toepfer (2018)). Being their only way to have access to 
those positions it is only natural that the more a female earns, that is, the more qualified her 
job is, the higher is the probability that she decides to enrol in school.  
Finally, as Aslanian (1988) and Lin and Wang (2015) point out females tend to return to 
school when their children are a bit older because they want to be an example for them or 
because they feel alone when their children begin to “leave the nest”. That is the reason why 
the effect observed for children between 6 and 15 years old on the probability that a female 
decides to enrol in school is lower. The same also happens for males but with a much lower 
magnitude, reason why we haven’t mentioned it in the previous section. 
In sum, these two models have shown us that the introduction of a universal basic income 
seems to have caused the number of people enrolled in school to increase. Considering that 
school enrolment is a proxy for population education, we can say schooling levels may have 
increase slightly for women and men as a result of a u.b.i.’s introduction. 
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Despite the fact the effects sign is the same for male heads and female heads, by analysing 
the values we come down to the conclusion that the effect, if it exists, is much more 
significant for male rather than for female heads. Even though Transfer isn’t significant for 
any of the cases it must be mentioned that Transfer’s p-value in regression 4.3. is 0.236 while 
Transfer’s p-value in regression 4.4. is 0,943. 
4.4. Test Mincome’s effect regarding people’s ability to choose jobs with 
which they identify most where they do not feel so explored 
4.4.1. Male head’s case 
To test the effect of an u.b.i. on male head’s satisfaction with his current job we estimate the 
following model: 
𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟)𝑖 +⁡𝛽3 ∗ log(𝑀𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶)𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗                    
𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
                          
As we can see in model 4.5. there were used three explanatory variables: the variable that 
interests us the most, that is, the amount the household with a male head has received, the 
amount the male head earns because higher wages are usually connected with higher 
satisfaction levels (Marcos and Garcia (2012)) and  the family size because the increase in the 
number of dependents decreases job satisfaction (Bilgic (1998)). 
(4.5.)
𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇 = 
= 
5 if 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ > 𝑎4 
4 if 𝑎3 < 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎4  
3 if  𝑎2 < 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎3  
2 if  𝑎1 < 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎2 
1 if 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎1  
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Table 5 – Effect of u.b.i. on people’s satisfaction with last job, Ordered Probit results for the male sample 
This model’s pseudo 𝑅2 is 0,043 which, at first view, seems like an incredibly low value with 
the model not being able to fit the data well. However, if we consider we are dealing with an 
ordinal probit model and that we are only using three explanatory variables the result 
becomes acceptable: the proof is that, according with the LR statistic, the model is globally 
significant for all conventional significance levels, with a p-value really close to zero.  
As we are dealing with an ordinal probit model we know that each coefficient’s estimate does 
not correspond to the marginal effects on the probabilities of each outcome. Thus, in Table 
6 we refer to the average marginal effects for each outcome.  
 Estimates of the average marginal effects of the Ordered Probit model 
Variables MHJOBSAT=1 MHJOBSAT=2 MHJOBSAT=3 MHJOBSAT=4 MHJOBSAT=5 
log 
(Transfer) 
0.0002455 
(0.0002554) 
0.0003288 
(0.0003435) 
0.000275 
(0.0002843) 
0.000215 
(0.0002272) 
-0.0010642 
(0.0011026) 
log 
(MHINC) 
-0.0036858* 
(0.0019484) 
-0.0049365* 
(0.0025328) 
-0.0041295* 
(0.0021149) 
-0.0032279* 
(0.0017671) 
0.0159797** 
(0.0081274) 
FAMSIZE -0.0032781** 
(0.0015502) 
-0.0043905** 
(0.0020151) 
-0.0036728** 
(0.0016839) 
-0.0028708** 
(0.0013982) 
0.0142121** 
(0.006411) 
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Table 6 – Marginal effect of u.b.i. on people’s satisfaction with last job, Ordered Probit results for the male 
sample 
As we can see below only FAMSIZE and log (MHINC) are somehow significant which is a 
model downside. It gets worse if we consider that Transfer, the variable we are studying, is 
not significant at all. 
According to the model, on average, ceteris paribus, an increase of 1% in the Mincome amount, 
causes the probability that a male head is totally satisfied with his job (MHJOBSAT=1) to 
increase by 0.02455 percentage points and the probability he ranks his satisfaction as a 2 
(meaning he is somehow satisfied with his current job) to increase by 0.03288 percentage 
points.  
Concerning the other variables, the probability that the male is dissatisfied with his job will 
increase if the household has a higher number of people, particularly infant children. 
Harder to explain is the fact that a higher wage level causes the male head’s dissatisfaction 
levels to increase. However, as Clark and Oswald (1996) point out, this is a common result 
arising from ordered probit models and may be because job satisfaction depends mainly on 
wage changes rather than the wage as a gross value. This way, as the wages have remained 
quite stable between the two years, expectations were not met, and workers became 
dissatisfied. These authors also point out that satisfaction levels tend to decrease with 
schooling levels, also due to unmet expectations, which, considering that education is 
positively connected with higher wages, may also contribute to explain the observed 
phenomena. 
4.4.2. Female head’s case 
To test the effect of an u.b.i. on female head’s satisfaction with her current job we estimate 
the following model: 
𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟)𝑖 +⁡𝛽3 ∗ log(𝐹𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶)𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗                 
𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
(4.6.)
48 
 
                              
 
Table 7 – Effect of u.b.i. on people’s ability to choose jobs that suits them best, Ordered Probit results for 
the female sample 
This model’s pseudo 𝑅2 is 0,090 which, at first view, seems like an incredibly low value with 
the model not being able to fit the data well. However, if we consider we are dealing with an 
ordinal probit model rather than the usual probit model and that we are only using three 
explanatory variables the result becomes more acceptable: the proof is that the LR test allows 
us to conclude the model is globally significant. 
As we are dealing with an ordinal probit model we know that each coefficient’s estimate does 
not correspond to the marginal effects on the probabilities of each outcome. Thus, in Table 
8, that we can see in Annex 3, we refer to the average marginal effects for each outcome.  
𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇 = 
= 
5 if 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ > 𝑎4 
4 if 𝑎3 < 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎4  
3 if  𝑎2 < 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎3  
2 if  𝑎1 < 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎2 
1 if 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑇∗ ≤ 𝑎1  
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As we can see below only FAMSIZE and log (FHINC) are significant which is a model 
downside (Nonetheless, FAMSIZE is significant at 1, 5 and 10%).  It gets worse if we 
consider that Transfer, the variable we are studying, is not significant at all.  
According to the model, on average, ceteris paribus, an increase of 1% in the Mincome 
amount, causes the probability that a female head is totally satisfied with her job 
(FHJOBSAT=1) to decrease by 0.02947 percentage points and the probability she ranks her 
job satisfaction as a 2 (meaning is somehow satisfied with job) to decrease by 0.0429 
percentage points.  
Concerning the other variables, the probability that the female head is satisfied with her last 
job will decrease if the household has a higher number of people, particularly infant children. 
The explanation proposed by Clark and Oswald (1996) allows us once more to understand 
why an increase in female head’s income leads to a decrease in the satisfaction levels but it 
does not allow us to understand why the effect’s magnitude is so high when compared with 
the male head’s case. However, this phenomena can be explained: according to Moore (2006) 
there are currently two types of women: traditional women and secular women. Traditional 
women believe that male deserve to earn more even if they perform the same takes women 
do and tend to have a higher job satisfaction even though they typically allocate themselves 
to part-time jobs. On a totally different position arise secular women, that is, women that 
believe and defend gender equality and who, as so, believe they should be entitled the same 
amount of money men get when they perform similar tasks. However, as even considering 
all the differences between genders there is still a part of the difference in gender pay gap 
that cannot be explained in other way rather than corresponding to discrimination, they will 
not be able to do as so: the result is that they will tend to report lower satisfaction levels. In 
Moore (2006) the country that is being analysed is Israel, where the percentage of traditional 
women is extremely higher than in Canada so we may conclude that in this experiment the 
higher amount of women were probably secular women. Keeping that in mind, and being 
aware that the glass ceiling effect defends that there is a bias that does not allow women to 
have access to top positions, the ones that pay the most (Albrecht, Bjorklund, and Vroman 
(2003)), we may conclude that the higher are the wages they are entitled the higher will gender 
pay gap be, thus the least satisfied will women tend to be. 
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5. Conclusion 
Exploring data from the Manitoba’s experience and using an econometrical approach, we 
made attempt to test whether u.b.i. has an impact on labor supply, school enrolment and 
satisfaction with last job. 
The results haven’t shown us evidence of empirical correlation between u.b.i. and the 
variables we were studying. However, results seem to point out that u.b.i. allows to increase 
school enrolment both for male as for female and to increase both male as female head’s 
satisfaction with last job. We consider this variables as poverty proxy’s because when you 
increase someone’s income, helping him escaping poverty, you decrease the probability that 
individual needs to submit himself to contemptuous or dangerous activities and, when you 
ensure someone doesn’t need to stop studying immediately, giving that person the ability to 
study, you also ensure that we will increase his human capital’s level, what will allow him to 
increase his income, thus stop being poor (what will also allow his future generations to 
enroll in school and vice-versa) (Tilak (2002)). The results’ downside is that u.b.i. also causes 
a decrease in the number of weeks worked, that can only be partially explained by people 
choosing to improve human capital levels. It has been observable that u.b.i.’s introduction 
effects were different for women and men. However, such difference can be explained 
because of the difference in the percentage of males and females that work. 
It becomes important however to mention that these pilot experiments have some 
limitations such as the fact that they do not allow us to collect information on all important 
issues. For example, the fact that they consider only the perspective of the net recipients and 
not the net payers’ perspective. It should also be considered that the pilot has a short-term 
horizon and it is implemented on a small scale while an u.b.i. is meant to be universal as its 
definition sustains. 
Random control tests become impossible hence that people know both the experience’s 
duration as well as the participants.  
Finally, even conclusions must be analyzed to see if spurious results have not arisen. Spurious 
results are conclusions that just simply arise because we are trying to find a connection 
between a set of variables for too long and that cannot be generalized, simply happened in a 
specific situation. Note that this does not put at risk the so called “accidents”, that is, even 
from a flawed experience, such as this one, it is possible to establish a relation of causality 
that will always occur between a given set of variables. 
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7. Annexes 
7.1. Annex 1 
Variables’ Description: 
DHEAD =1 if household is a double-headed household  
=0 if household is a single-headed household or a single-
individual household 
FAMSIZE Total number of people that constitutes the household 
Age0to5 Number of children aged 1 to 5 years old existent in the 
household 
Age6to15 Number of children aged 6 to 15 years old existent in household 
Age16M Number of people with more than fifteen years old in the 
household excluding household’s head(s) 
AGEM Male head’s age in years 
AGEF Female head’s age in years 
FAMINCT Total family income between 1973 and 1974 excluding 
Mincome’s transfers. Values in USD 
INCWNMH Family income excluding male head’s earnings between 1973 
and 1974. Values in USD 
INCWNFH Family income excluding female head’s earnings between 1973 
and 1974. Values in USD 
Transfer Transfer received between 1973 and 1974. Values in USD 
MHWEEK Average number of weeks the male head has worked per year 
between 1973 and 1974 
FHWEEK Average number of weeks the female head has worked per year 
between 1973 and 1974 
MHJOBSAT Male head’s satisfaction level with his current job, evaluated 
based on a Likert scale where 1 is totally dissatisfied and 5 is 
totally satisfied 
FHJOBSAT Female head’s satisfaction level with her current job, evaluated 
based on a Likert scale where 1 is totally dissatisfied and 5 is 
totally satisfied 
MHYSCH Current male head’s schooling level 
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FHYSCH Current female head’s schooling level 
MH_SCH =1 if household’s male head is enrolled in school 
=0 if household’s male head is not enrolled in school 
FH_SCH =1 if household’s female head is enrolled in school 
=0 if household’s female head is not enrolled in school 
 
7.2. Annex 2 
Descriptive Statistics: 
Variable Name Number of obs. Mean Sd Min. Max. 
DHEAD 2156 0.57 ------------- 0 1 
FAMSIZE 2156 3.26 2.00 1 12 
Age0to5 2156 0.53 0.80 0 5 
Age6to15 2156 0.83 1.27 0 8 
Age16M 2156 0.35 0.74 0 5 
AGEM 1468 36.48 12.65 18 74 
AGEF 1911 34.44 12.38 15 65 
FAMINCT 2156 11170.87 7632.11 0 85379 
INCWNMH 2156 5347.40 5181.07 0 83029 
INCWNFH 2156 8893.87 7587.11 0 76102 
Transfer 2156 8152.33 9000.58 0 52936 
MHWEEK 1468 30,90 21,05 0 52 
FHWEEK 1911 18,22 20,27 0 52 
MHJOBSAT 1116 2,04 ------------- 1 5 
FHJOBSAT 916 2,04 ------------- 1 5 
MHYSCH 1468 8,65 4,67 0 24 
FHYSCH  1911 9,19 3,57 0 19 
MH_SCH 1468 0,09 0,28 0 1 
FH_SCH 1911 0,07 0,25 0 1 
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7.3. Annex 3 
 Estimates of the average marginal effects of the Ordered Probit model 
Variables FHJOBSAT=1 FHJOBSAT=2 FHJOBSAT=3 FHJOBSAT=4 FHJOBSAT=5 
log 
(Transfer) 
-0.0002947 
(0.0002869) 
-0.000429 
(0.0004182) 
-0.0003127 
(0.0003023) 
-0.0002562 
(0.0002498) 
0.0012926 
(0.0012458) 
log 
(FHINC) 
-0.0023648** 
(0.0010459) 
-0.0034434** 
(0.0014817) 
-0.0025094** 
(0.0010844) 
-0.0020564** 
(0.0009707) 
0.010374** 
(0.0043806) 
FAMSIZE -0.0066665*** 
(0.0017649) 
-0.0097068*** 
(0.0025908) 
-0.0070741*** 
(0.0018988) 
-0.005797*** 
(0.0017744) 
0.0292443*** 
(0.0070758) 
Table 8 – Marginal effect of u.b.i. on people’s satisfaction with last job, Ordered Probit results for the female 
sample 
 
